

formulation of an agreed global strategy. It was also meant to take account of current French susceptibilities about the control of nuclear weapons and the exchange of atomic secrets. However, on French initiative, the Committee finally presented to the Congress a much emasculated resolution which the Congress, after a spirited debate, rejected in favor of the original. The resolution, because of its careful balance, should be read as a whole. But among its salient points are the following: the urgent need to bring the European "Shield" forces up to the levels laid down in MC-70; the need for reexamination of the structure and control of NATO's atomic forces; the need for a common NATO armaments funds and the widest possible interchange between the member governments of atomic information and the implied need for a drastic overhaul of NATO's air and naval command structures. All this—and more.

I am no economist and I shall therefore deal briefly with the work of the Economic Committee—more briefly than it deserves. The philosophy behind its resolution was expansionist, derestrictive and cooperative. It called for governments to adhere to policies designed to promote higher levels of employment and living standards. It stressed the need for governments to avoid restrictive economic practices and called upon governments wherever possible, to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers. Above all it stressed the need for closer economic integration within the Atlantic Community and drew attention to the gaps that exist in the existing arrangements for economic, scientific and technological collaboration. With this in mind the committee suggested that governments should consider the possibility of transforming the Organization for European Economic Cooperation into an Organization for Atlantic Economic Cooperation in which not only the West European but also the North American countries would be full members. The proposed new organization would have wide functions. It would be designed to form an economic bridge between the European Economic Community, the economies of the rest of Europe and those of the remainder of the free world. It would promote coordinated policies for the expansion of the North Atlantic economies without inflation or recession. It would also coordinate national policies and develop co-operative policies for accelerating the economic development of the underdeveloped areas of the world.

Before the Congress it had generally been anticipated that much attention would be focused on the relations between the countries of the Atlantic Community and those of the remainder of the free world, many of which are underdeveloped and most of which are uncommitted in the world struggle. This expectation was not disappointed and most committees of the Congress, in fact, dealt in one way or another with this problem. But the report of the Free World Committee itself is rather a disappointing document. This does not mean, however, that the committee, and the Congress as a whole, did not recognize that possibly the most crucial problem confronting the Atlantic Community over the next decade was that of establishing a mutually satisfactory relationship with the new and emerging countries. Speaker after speaker—from the Archbishop of York at the first plenary session to Mr. Gaitskill and Mr. Macmillan at the special plenary session—emphasized this. It was also clear to the Congress that not only was it necessary for the Atlantic countries to adopt the right political stance toward the newer countries, based on a frank and full recognition of their right to political independence, but also that this political independence would be an empty concept unless it was based on solid economic foundations. Because of this

massive and sustained aid from the West would be needed over a long period.

There was a general feeling that such aid should be given on its own merits, since we in the Atlantic Community have "a duty to help less-developed countries to help themselves." But there were many who also felt that a massive effort was required to offset the Soviet challenge in this field, given the fact that the new countries are a primary target for Communist penetration.

There was also widespread agreement as to the forms which aid should take. First, the need for a steady, and probably increased, flow of long term capital to stimulate capital investment and growth. (It was recognized that, of necessity, the bulk of this investment would be public investment but there was a strong feeling that steps to stimulate private investment in developing countries should be taken.) Second, expanded technical assistance programs. Third, as Mr. Cahan, the Deputy Secretary General of OEEC put it in a notable speech: "It is very necessary, if we are honestly to develop these underdeveloped countries, to give them an opportunity to sell what they can best produce in our markets. There is no other long-term solution. It is no use pouring money in, it is no use giving them technical help if the resultant product simply has to be burnt or thrown away. I think in this—as perhaps in other things—it is worth looking at what our Russian friends are doing. Our Russian friends, when they give technical assistance and financial aid, do not stop there. This is a very important difference between what the Russians have done and what we have done. The Russians are prepared to take the exportable product of the countries which they wish to help and to take them at almost any price, any quantity and any quality. I do not suggest that we go as far as that, but I think we ought to do a little better than we do now."

There was also widespread agreement that in a program of this nature there was a clear need for greater coordination between the NATO members. Such coordination, it was felt, could well be advanced through quiet consultation within NATO, although there was little support for the idea of converting NATO itself into an agency for channeling aid to the underdeveloped countries. There was less unanimity over the need for new agencies for aid, and if so, what form such agencies should take. Some felt that the proposed new organization for Atlantic Economic Cooperation should play a role in this field. Others that private participation in aid programs should be stimulated by the creation of a World Development Corporation. Others again (i.e. the Free World Committee, in a resolution adopted by the Congress) that an International Development Association should be established, broader than and independent of NATO, open to all nations and working "either directly or through existing international and regional associations, including the World Bank and other organs of the United Nations." (It was not clear whether this agency should be designed to encourage the provision of long-term, low-interest loans, as a counterpart to the World Bank's "bankable" loans, or whether it would be wider in scope.) And a strong minority felt that, although increased aid was needed, it should be channeled through existing institutions, especially those linked with the United Nations.

The Communist Bloc Committee reached, with little difficulty, unanimity in their diagnosis of the scope of the Communist challenge. And they were unanimous, too, in their proposals. On the political front, they called for perseverance in negotiations with the governments of the Communist coun-

tries, for an increase in East-West contacts and exchanges, and for a proclamation by the Atlantic Powers of their continued determination to do all within their power by peaceful means to enable the satellite countries to achieve self-determination. They pointed out the inadequacy of the West's response to Communist ideological warfare and called for more effective measures, within the NATO framework, for matching it, and also for the creation of an international, unofficial, organization designed to serve the same end throughout the world. Finally, on the economic side, the committee proposed that, to counter the growing Communist economic offensive, a NATO Economic Council should be created as a policymaking, planning, and coordinating body.

What emerges from this plethora of paper—of reports and resolutions and recommendations? It is sometimes a little difficult to see the wood for the trees, and others who have fought their way through the paper jungle of this Congress may have somewhat different ideas as to what constituted the real hard core of the Congress. But, as I see it, these were the four main underlying themes:

(a) The first was the universal recognition of the continuing need for the alliance, coupled with the conviction that if the alliance were to endure, let alone prosper, the concept of the interdependence of the countries of the Atlantic Community must somehow be given real flesh and bones. But beyond that there was divergence. On the one side there are the adventurous spirits who feel that the time is now ripe to give the embryo Atlantic Community an institutional framework, moving toward some form of Federal structure. And they have influential support—M. Spaak, for example, came down personally in favor of the principle of Atlantic institutions taking decisions by a weighted majority vote. On the other side are the more cautious spirits—with whom, I am sure, the majority of our governments are at present in sympathy—who feel that progress toward the greater integration of the Atlantic Community must be cautious and pragmatic and functional. For the present, a meeting ground was found in the recommendations of the Political Committee (which may, of course, lead to a meeting of 100 wise men next spring) and in their expressed belief that the demands of the alliance and our times make some further erosion of our national sovereignties inevitable.

(b) The second theme, to my mind, was the very evident dissatisfaction of the Congress with many aspects of NATO defense—in particular the failure to achieve the force targets laid down in MC-70, to weakness of political control over the "philosophy and practice of war," the failure to achieve any rational interdependence in arms research and production, the holes in the European air defense system, the ramshackle air and maritime command structures, and the weakness of our antisubmarine defenses. The support which the Congress gave to Mr. George Brown's strong words on the subject was significant. It is perhaps more doubtful if significant action by governments will necessarily result.

(c) The third theme (and perhaps the most important) was the universal recognition that the Atlantic Community must be outward looking, that it cannot, and should not, constitute itself a self-regarding club of the rich, white, free nations. With this went a recognition that our countries must speedily create a clear, consistent, and long-term policy toward those countries which lie outside both our community and the Communist bloc, and that such a policy will call for a long-sustained effort on all our parts. But there was some considerable wooliness as to how such a policy should be

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applied and how best the efforts of the member countries should be concerted.

(d) Finally, there was an equally clear recognition that all our efforts would be stultified unless our community was able, in concert, to achieve something which has so far eluded it—the combination of sustained economic growth without inflation. With this went a recognition that, possibly, new economic institutions, and, most certainly, a more effective coordination of our economic policies and a greater awareness by our peoples of the issues at stake were essential.

But, all said and done, it can still be asserted that the results of the Congress were rather pedestrian and unimaginative, that the delegates took refuge behind their proposals for a mass of new institutions, and that the Congress, unlike its predecessor at The Hague, sounded no brave, new note. All this is true in part. But the Congress was concerned with the affairs of a going concern—the Atlantic Community—and the affairs of going concerns are usually rather terre-à-terre. True, the delegates did suggest rather a bellyful of new institutions. But, if they had not, they would have been accused of lack of imagination and there are admitted gaps, which need filling, in the economic structure of the free world. It is also true that the Congress sounded no clarion call for action. Partly this is the fault of an unnecessarily mute declaration. But it is also an echo of the times in which we in the West live. If we are honest we must admit that leadership in the West is lacking—and lacking most where it is most needed—in and from the United States. It would have been to ask too much of a Congress of this nature to bridge these gaps in leadership. But it may have pointed a way.

Ultimately, of course, this Congress will not be judged by the paper it produced. A stirring declaration may be a good thing. So are imaginative and practical proposals. But the followthrough is the thing. What is really significant is the seriousness of purpose of the delegates and their determination, on their return home, really to push with their own peoples and with the appropriate national and international organizations and with their governments the proposals which they have backed on paper. This is the yardstick by which this Congress will in the end be judged.

### The Captive Peoples Pray for Help

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

**HON. THOMAS J. LANE**

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 25, 1959

Mr. LANE. Mr. Speaker, on July 17, the White House issued a proclamation designating the third week in July as Captive Nations Week, and urging the people of the United States of America to study the plight of the Soviet-dominated nations and to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of the peoples of these captive nations.

This was an inspiring declaration that raised the hopes of the oppressed peoples within the Communist empire.

Yet, within 2½ weeks, there occurred the most amazing reversal of policy in American history.

On August 3, the White House announced that it had invited Soviet Dictator Khrushchev to visit the United States, and to enjoy the hospitality of the American people.

And the captive nations were plunged into despair.

Would the United States and Soviet Russia agree to noninterference in one another's domestic affairs?

If so, that would mean the end of hope for millions in the captive countries.

What had happened to the United States which, from the days when it had won its own independence, had been loyal to the principle of liberty with justice for all?

Who can trust the United States after "Desecration Day," when the officials of the U.S. Government welcome the Red dictator who is responsible for so much of the world's misery?

The victims of Russian communism pray, not in the churches that have been closed to them by atheistic despots, but from behind the locked doors of their homes.

Praying that the unpredictable behavior of the U.S. Government does not represent the freedom-loving American people who would never compromise with evil.

Praying that the voice of the American people will be heard above the vague and vacillating pronouncements of its Government.

"Dear God, we know that the American people are not afraid of the truth. We know that they do not worship materialism, closing their hearts to the cry of humanity. We have seen their courage and their generous spirit. From our own relatives who left our homeland to seek a better life in America and found it there, we have heard how they live up to the responsibilities of freedom.

"Washington, Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt, these were the leaders who spoke up for human rights.

"But where is the conscience of America, now, when the Government opens its arms not only to our oppressor, but to the Red tyrant who is also determined to destroy free America?

"The policy of the American Government cannot represent the true beliefs of the American people because they would not change so overnight.

"Father in Heaven, intercede for us.

"Help our pleas to break through the rigid barriers which enslave us, so that they may reach and touch the conscience of the American people.

"We do not ask them for the charity of material things, because we know they would be quick to give it.

"We do not ask them to risk their security and their lives to effect our liberation.

"But we do ask for their moral support, which is the soul of America and its greatest strength.

"When Khrushchev, the master of deceit is visited upon the American people, we ask them to protest in an orderly manner.

"So that firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right will prevail

over the counsels of those who seek an accommodation with tyranny.

"When all seems lost, we have faith in the power of prayer.

"Help us to reach the hearts of a great, free people so that they may speak up for liberty with justice, and repudiate the shameful spectacle of 'Desecration Day' that is being thrust upon them.

"We pray for universal freedom under God."

### There's a Lack of Interest in the Interest Problem

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

**HON. HOWARD W. ROBISON**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 28, 1959

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, the lack of action by this Congress on the extremely important problem of Treasury bond interest rates is a disgrace. Without a realistic increase in interest rates the Treasury will be put in a nearly impossible debt-management position and the blame will lie squarely with the Congress.

I include three opinions highlighting the great need for action. One is a column by the objective and nonpartisan financial writer, Sylvia Porter, published in the Washington Evening Star of August 26, 1959, an editorial from the New York Times of August 27, and an editorial from the Wall Street Journal of August 27.

[From the Washington Evening Star, Aug. 26, 1959]

WARNING TO CONGRESS ON BONDS  
(By Sylvia Porter)

Warning to the 86th Congress: Before you adjourn, pass a law permitting the Treasury to raise the interest rate paid U.S. savings bonds holders or you will:

Invite an avalanche of cash-ins of savings bonds by little investors who have bought these bonds with the idea of keeping them to maturity, but who are now aware that the top rate they can earn on the bonds is far below what they can get on a deposit in most savings banks;

Drastically curtail the sale of new bonds to wage and salary earners who know that the pay scale on the bonds has become glaringly out of line with the general level of interest rates;

Risk forcing the Treasury to borrow cash via expensive short-term loans in order to get the money needed to pay off bonds presented for redemption by disillusioned holders;

Give corporations which never liked the job of maintaining employee payroll savings programs a perfect excuse to cut off the program;

Undermine the reputation of the Treasury among financiers the world over who are fully informed about our debt management problems.

#### FORTY MILLION HOLDERS

Over 40 million Americans now own more than \$42 billion of these riskless, nonmarketable bonds which pay 3 percent interest if held for 3 years, 3½ percent interest if held to maturity in 8 years, 11 months. Over